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On 31 December 2020, The Hague District Court issued its summary judgment in
De Lugt v The Dutch Government, closing a tumultuous year which had started
with the first confirmed cases with – ironically – a legal COVID-19 case. The case
is seemingly unimportant – both because of its summary and its individual(istic)
character, or at most a case of constitutional law. Yet, the case also has wider
repercussions for international human rights law, including the right to leave and re-
enter his/her State and the right to private life.
The summary procedure was initiated by Mr Pols, the lawyer of Viruswaarheid,
an organisation concerned with countering recognised scientific propositions (and
which unsuccessfully filed its own case a few days later). On Christmas Eve, he
travelled to Zanzibar (Tanzania) with Ms De Lugt and their children. Since 29
December 2020, following the rise of a seemingly more contagious mutation of
SARS-CoV-2, the Dutch Government requires a (negative) Polymerase Chain
Reaction (PCR) test (dating from the last 3 days) and a signed declaration upon
return to The Netherlands from any “high-risk area”. This decision follows European
Commission Recommendation 2020/1743, describing real-time PCR testing as the
“gold standard”.
Under Articles 7 and 53-54 of the Dutch Public Health Law (PHL), the governors
of the 25 ‘safety regions’ (i.e. provinces and several sub-entities) are allowed to
give instructions to operators or civil (air)ports to stop the further spread of the
pandemic. Tanzania being declared a high-risk area by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, airline companies travelling to its territory were on this basis obligated to
check whether their passengers carry these forms – a rare piece of extraterritorial
enforcement jurisdiction.
The right to (re-)enter one’s State
Claimants requested the annulment of the governors’ decision to undertake a PCR
test for, in subsequent order, all travellers, Dutch nationals, or the family itself. The
judge decided (only) in the family’s favour and required a clear legislative basis
rather than the vague wording of the PHL. Among others, claimants invoked Article
3 Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Paragraph
2 of which states “[n]o one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the
state of which he is a national.”
In another blog post, Rutsel Martha and Stephen Bailey argued that it is not always
lawful for a State to deprive individuals of the right to enter their own country to
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contain the transmission of COVID-19. Moreover, they examined the emphasis on
and choice for “national[s]” rather than mere ‘individuals’ in the ECHR.
The New Year’s Eve judgment mainly turned on the unjustified extraterritorial effect
of the PHL, but a proportionality assessment (prioritising the right to leave and
(re-)enter) seems implicit in the court’s reasoning.
A right to travel?
As Article 12 ICCPR attests, closely related to the right to (re-)enter its State (Art.
12(4)) is the right to travel in the first place, or the freedom of movement (Art. 12(2)).
General Comment No. 27 begins with “[l]iberty of movement is an indispensable
condition for the free development of a person”. Yet, it is probably one of those rights
that has taken a more prominent place in domestic law. Since 1823, it is recognised
as a fundamental constitutional right in the United States (Corfield v Coryell), albeit
remaining within the jurisdiction of the states (unlike one of the four European
freedoms). After all, as was famously opined in Kent v Dulles, “[t]ravel abroad, like
travel within the country, …, may be as close to the heart of the individual as the
choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our
scheme of values.”
However, whether nationally or internationally, this right is not unlimited. In United
States v Shinnick, the subject was placed in a 14-day federal quarantine following a
smallpox outbreak in Sweden in the 1960s. A contextual interpretation of Article 12
ICCPR also shows that the right to travel nationally (Art. 12(1)) and internationally
(Art. 12(2)) can be subject to those restrictions “which are provided for by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or
morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights
recognized in the present Covenant.” (Art. 12(3)). In Peltonen v Finland, examining
the travaux préparatoires, the Human Rights Committee concluded (at para. 8.3) that
the drafters intended that the right to leave could not be used to circumvent one’s
national obligations (in casu military service).
Moreover, it has been argued that the right to leave/travel does not automatically
entail the right to enter again (Satvinder Juss, at p. 294). Hence, the right to
(re-)enter its State is perhaps more of a supplement rather than a complement.
The right to physical, mental and moral integrity
Article 8 ECHR (the right to respect for private/family life) includes a right to reject
medical treatment, and specific duties to keep medical information confidential. On
the other hand, the European human rights institutions have both held that relatively
minor (compulsory) medical tests may constitute a proportionate interference
with Article 8, even when consent is lacking. Compulsory tuberculosis screening
(Acmanne et al. v Belgium), hepatitis B vaccination (Boffa et al. v San Marino), and
polio inoculation (Salvetti v Italy) have been held proportionate.
It is thus rather likely that a minor PCR swab will withstand the European Court
of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) scrutiny, if such claims against the State will ever be
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declared admissible. This may be different for criminal investigations (setting a high
bar for interferences) or when medical treatment/testing of children is refused by
their parents (see, e.g., Glass v United Kingdom).
This conclusion could change if the Sars-CoV-2 vaccine would be declared
compulsory, in particular when the State would not adequately inform about possible
health risks (Vilnes et al. v Norway). Next to constitutional rights, ECtHR case
law is undoubtedly one of the reasons why European States have not made the
SARS-CoV-2 vaccines mandatory. Non-compulsory vaccines do not seem to entail
compensation in case of failure or unintended side-effects (Baytüre et al. v Turkey).
However, the need for the traveller’s consent for a PCR test is acknowledged by the
parliamentary history of the PHL:
“The cooperation of the traveller in such an investigation cannot be
enforced directly. However, the mayor may decide to subject travellers to
quarantine measures under Article 35, in the case its requirements are
fulfilled.” (Kamerstuk 31316, 3, at 54)
The judge agreed that the virus’ further spread in The Netherlands, whether by
contagious passengers returning from abroad, should be contained. Yet, even
though a measure affects personal integrity and the right to inviolability of the body
(Article 11 Dutch Constitution) only minimally, and the test is “done quickly” and “little
onerous” (Government’s pleading note, para. 2.8), at least a concrete legal basis
should be available according to the judge (para. 10).
The Dutch Government reacted and amended the PHL and Temporary Regulation
on COVID-19 Measures (Art. 6.7b), putting international airline and shipping
companies on a par with public transport. This was deemed sufficient by the same
court in the case lodged by Viruswaarheid and 29 Dutchmen abroad, who tried to
broaden the exclusion of PCR tests to all Dutch nationals. Yet, what it (again) seems
to overlook are sufficient safeguards to prevent communication and disclosure of
personal health data, which may be violating Article 8 ECHR (see, e.g. Mockuté v
Lithuania, paras. 93-94).
Proportionality
The summary judge was correct in holding that interferences with human rights
can only be justified if they have a clear, accessible and foreseeable legal basis.
However, any balancing of the right to leave and (re-)enter its State with, for
example, the right to reject medical treatment/testing also entails a four-step
proportionality assessment.
The State’s measure, i.e. a negative PCR test before boarding, (i) seems to serve
a legitimate purpose (preventing the further spread of COVID-19), (ii) is a (factually)
suitable means to detect (most) positive cases – a definitive diagnose is not required
(see judgment 8 January, para. 4.13), and (iii) seems proportional considering its
little intrusiveness. However, it may not be ‘necessary’ (cfr. General Comment No.
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27, para. 14). The Netherlands could impose an obligation to conduct such test upon
arrival, or simply a quarantine (which is nevertheless still compulsory). Alternatively,
when the purpose is to curtail the spread on board the airplane rather than in The
Netherlands, it remains to be seen whether this is a legitimate purpose.
Closing remarks
While Mr Pols handed out a slap on the wrist of The Netherlands – pardon the pun –
it is by no means certain whether this will be upheld in the appeal proceedings that
have been initiated by the Dutch Government. Nor are proceedings before the Dutch
Supreme Court and/or ECtHR entirely excluded, although these seem unlikely in
light of the judgment of 8 January and the ECtHR’s case law.
Finally, perhaps along the line some judge will burst the family’s bubble. It was not
only foreseeable but also announced (a day before the family’s departure) that a
negative test would become mandatory also for EU citizens. Planning a Christmas
holiday to Zanzibar and refusing a PCR test could be considered as an abuse of
rights (ex iniuria (ius) non oritur), e.g. through the ECtHR’s admissibility criteria
(Article 35(3)(a)).
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